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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the late 1990s boom in ICT investment was unsustainable for both
macro and micro reasons; we are unlikely again to witness an interval in which computer hardware
investment grows at an annual rate greater than 30 percent for five straight years.  Analysts who base
their optimism on the role of Moore’s Law in creating endless exponential growth of computer
power neglect the need for an equally rapid explosion in the demand for computer power.  Simply
put, this paper argues that supply does not create its own demand  
Yet a failure of ICT investment to revive to the ebullient growth performance of the late
1990s does not doom productivity growth to slip back to the dismal pre-1995 era.   Instead, we argue
that conventional analyses have exaggerated the contribution of ICT investment to the post-1995
productivity performance.  Productivity can continue to grow at respectable rates even if ICT
investment continues to slump.   While  accepting  the contribution of ICT production to
economy-wide productivity growth, the paper cites four reasons to suspect that standard analyses
have exaggerated the contribution of ICT use, the so-called “capital deepening” effect.  First, these
analyses unrealistically assume that the productivity payoff of computer use is instantaneous upon
installation. Second, recent research indicates that the strong revival of productivity growth in retail
trade occurred for reasons other than ICT use.  Third, differential productivity growth across states
in the U. S. appears to be related to ICT production but not to ICT use.  Fourth, retailers in Europe
use the same ICT equipment as in the U. S. yet have failed to enjoy a productivity revival, again
indicating that factors other than ICT use are central.   
The core of the paper is to show that while exponential increases in the supply of computer
power are ongoing, the growth in demand for that power was unsustainably high in the late 1990s.
The macro environment fostering ICT investment included the stock market bubble, as well as
temporary factors that held down the inflation rate and allowed the Fed to pursue a monetary policy
of benign neglect.  The micro environment featured numerous factors that boosted the demand for
ICT investment in the late 1990s only temporarily, including the telecom bubble, the fact that the
web could only be invented once, the legacy of the failed dotcoms, and the little-noticed fact that
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I.  Introduction 
No macroeconomic magnitude is more important for the future evolution of the economy 
than productivity growth, and none is harder to predict. Productivity growth forecasts are needed 
by monetary policymakers attempting to gauge the growth rate of potential output, the 
economy’s “speed limit.” So too is a predicted path of future productivity growth needed for 
forecasts of future government budgets, deficits, debt, and dates of potential Social Security 
crises, not to mention the future revenue and employment requirements that guide capital 
spending plans in every sector of private industry. 
Yet, without exception, economists failed to forecast the marked acceleration of U. S. 
productivity growth after 1995, just as they had failed to anticipate in advance the two-decade 
slowdown in productivity growth after 1972.  With both of these major failures as precedents, it 
is surprising that there is such a widespread consensus that the post-1995 productivity revival 
will continue into the indefinite future—that is, that the productivity growth recorded from 1995 
to 2002 is more relevant to the long-term future over the next decade or two than the more 
dismal precedent of 1972 to 1995.  The very phrase “New Economy” connotes such a permanent 
change in regime, in contrast to a hypothetical alternative label, such as “bubble economy,“ that 
would treat the change in regime as temporary and short lived.  Is such an assumption of 
permanence in the productivity growth revival warranted?  Did the revival contain one-time 
elements that are unlikely to be repeated? 
 
Productivity Growth and ICT Investment 
Important studies of the post-1995 productivity growth revival have concluded that its Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 2 
 
 
primary source, and perhaps its only source, was the post-1995 acceleration of growth in real 
investment in information and communication technology (ICT).  This paper begins by 
examining the record of U. S.  productivity growth, distinguishes between cyclical and structural 
elements of the post-1995 revival, and then reviews evidence on the role of ICT investment in 
achieving the revival.  The major conclusion is that the magnitude of ICT investment’s 
contribution to the productivity growth revival has been exaggerated; ICT deserves substantial 
credit, but not all the credit that it has previously received.  In reaching this conclusion, we focus 
primarily on the example of the retail trade sector, which emerges both as a primary location of 
the revival in the United States and as by far the most important industry explaining why the 
United States enjoyed a revival while Europe did not.   
  Whether ICT investment explained half, most, or all of the US productivity growth 
revival, clearly a critical ingredient in predicting future productivity growth is to determine 
whether ICT investment will soon return to the heady growth rates of the late 1990s, or whether 
instead that growth rested on unsustainable elements that are unlikely to be repeated.  The core 
of the paper is suggested by its subtitle, “Does Supply Create its Own Demand?”  When steady 
advances in chip-making technology create geometric increases in the supply of computer power, 
does the marketplace automatically generate a demand for all that new computer power?  This 
paper argues that supply does not automatically create its own demand, and that a continuing 
explosion of computer power over the next decade may lead to a steady decline in the share of 
nominal GDP devoted to current-dollar spending on ICT investment, rather than a return to the 
high growth rates of real ICT investment experienced in the 1990s.  “The real problem is 
demand.  It seems that the supercharged spending on technology between 1998 and 2000 owed Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 3 
 
 
much to the coincidence of business, product, and liquidity cycles.  There is an underlying non-
cyclical growth story, but it is smaller than we thought” (Lex, 2001). 
 
Macro: The Positive Feedback Loop 
The treatment of supply and demand for ICT investment is divided into two parts, which, 
in shorthand, can be considered the “macro” component and the “micro” component.  The 
macroeconomic environment of the late 1990s reflected a remarkable “positive feedback loop” in 
which four major factors each achieved historically unprecedented performance, and in doing so, 
fed back and reinforced the behavior of the others.  The boom in ICT investment, created by a 
confluence of microeconomic supply and demand elements described separately, fueled the stock 
market boom and contributed to low inflation.  The stock market provided cheap finance to spur 
the ICT investment boom and added to output growth through its wealth effect on consumer 
behavior.  Low inflation made it possible for the Federal Reserve (the Fed) to avoid tight 
monetary policy, while monetary policy, by keeping interest rates relatively low, boosted the 
demand for ICT investment and supported the stock market boom.  Each of these elements made 
the demand for ICT investment higher than it would have been otherwise, and created a larger 
response of real ICT investment to rapid declines in ICT prices than would have occurred 
without the macro positive feedback loop. 
 
Micro: The Unsustainable Demand for ICT Equipment in the Late 1990s 
An acceleration in the rate of decline of computer prices, made possible by a faster 
“Moore‘s Law” cycle in the development of new computer chips, kicked off the New Economy 
ICT boom of the late 1990s.  Prices that fell more rapidly encouraged firms and consumers to Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 4 
 
 
replace old computers more quickly.  Yet the demand for these ever-cheaper computers 
depended in part on the development of new reasons to buy them, and several factors, most 
notably the invention of the World Wide Web (WWW), spurred an explosion in demand that 
matched the expansion of supply.  The ongoing evolution of technological development in the 
supply of computer power may not, however, generate a repeat occurrence of the demand for 
ICT investment equipment experienced in the late 1990s.  Our analysis begins with the overhang 
of underutilized fiber-optic cable and telecom equipment, perhaps the greatest technological 
bubble in the history of the modern world.  We continue with the surfeit of equipment no longer 
needed by failed e-commerce firms, the “dotcoms,” the dimming prospect that the Internet will 
live up to its initial promise for either consumer e-commerce or business-to-business commerce, 
and our most important and controversial proposition that software innovation has failed to take 
advantage of explosive growth in hardware capacity, leaving both business firms and consumers 
lacking reasons to replace their old computers at anything like the pace that was common in the 
1990s.   The section on the micro demand for computer power can be summarized as saying 
“there can be many slips between the cup of semiconductor technology and the lip of 
macroeconomic performance.”   
  The paper begins with the bare facts about the productivity revival, the distinction 
between cyclical and structural components of the post-1995 revival, and the contribution of ICT 
investment to the revival.  We then argue that previous studies may have overstated the 
importance of ICT investment in the revival and link this overstatement to the puzzling failure of 
Europe to achieve a productivity growth revival of its own.  Whether the ICT investment boom 
was the sole cause of the productivity growth revival or only a large cause, its role in the revival Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 5 
 
 
was central, raising the question whether it can recur in the future or was fundamentally a 
temporary phenomenon.  The middle section of the paper is devoted to the macro elements, the 
“positive feedback loop” that fed the economy’s strength and created a greater response of 
demand for ICT equipment than would have occurred otherwise.  The final section of the paper 
is devoted to the micro elements of unsustainability in the late 1990s ICT investment boom. 
 
II.  Dimensions of the Post-1995 Productivity Growth Revival 
This section describes the basic dimensions of US productivity behavior over the postwar 
period and in greater detail for the 1990s.  We then turn to an analysis of the cyclical component 
of the late 1990s’ productivity growth revival and to an interpretation of the more recent upsurge 
of productivity growth experienced in late 2001 and early 2002. 
 
The Record of Productivity Growth since 1950   
Table 1 presents the basic dimensions of the post-1995 US productivity growth revival in 
contrast to the previous postwar period.  The analysis is based on quarterly data for four sectors 
published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS):  nonfarm private business, 
manufacturing, and two subdivisions within manufacturing: durables and nondurables.  In 
addition, data for nonfarm nonmanufacturing, although unpublished, can be calculated as a 
residual.
1  The left three columns of Table 1 exhibit annual growth rates of output per hour in 
each sector for the longer intervals divided in 1972:Q2 and 1995:Q4.  The right three columns 
                                                           
1.  This calculation is performed using 1996 weights of nominal (current-dollar) spending in each sector.   
The nonfarm private business sector is about 78 percent of GDP, the manufacturing sector is 16 percent, and the 
nonfarm nonmanufacturing “residual” sector is about 62 percent of GDP. 
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divide the most recent 1995–2002 interval into three subintervals divided in 2000:Q2 and 
2001:Q3, quarters chosen to encompass the period of slow growth in real GDP. 
Looking first at the broadest aggregate, the nonfarm private business sector in the top 
line, we see that the annual rate of productivity growth accelerated by 1.11 percentage points 
after 1995, and the rate achieved after 1995 of 2.53 percent almost matched the 2.66 rate of the 
earlier postwar era, 1950–1972.  The post-1995 revival for nondurable manufacturing was 
similar, with a pickup of 0.90 percent and a post-1995 growth rate almost as fast as in 1950–
1972.  The pattern for durable manufacturing is different, with no slowdown at all, but rather an 
initial acceleration after 1972 and an even greater second-stage acceleration after 1995.  The 
residual nonfarm nonmanufacturing sector (most of the economy) did worse in 1995–2002 
relative to pre-1972 than did the entire economy, simply because durable manufacturing did so 
much better.  The post-1995 acceleration was 1.05 percent, but the post-1995 growth rate of 2.05 
fell well short of the pre-1972 growth rate of 2.64 percent.  A puzzle that has perplexed many 
observers, including Griliches (1994), is that, in the earlier postwar era, productivity growth 
proceeded at roughly equal rates in manufacturing and the rest of the economy (ie, the residual 
sector), and this is validated in Table 1, but the 1972–1995 slowdown period was entirely 
concentrated in nonmanufacturing with no slowdown at all in manufacturing.  The post-1995 
period witnessed a substantial recovery in nonmanufacturing, but not enough to close the gap 
with the manufacturing sector. 
  The right half of Table 1 decomposes the post-1995 period into the boom period of the 
late 1990s ending in 2000:Q2, the period of slow output growth over the following five quarters, 
followed by the recovery period after 2001:Q3.  Productivity growth responded to the output Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 7 
 
 
growth slowdown by decelerating sharply during the five quarters of slow output growth, and in 
the durable manufacturing sector productivity growth was essentially zero during this interval.  
Then, when the economy recovered after 2001:Q3, productivity growth exploded to rates even 
faster than in 1995–2000 in each sector. 
 
Cyclical Dimensions of Productivity Growth  
Ever since the early work of Hultgren (1960) and Okun (1962), economists have 
recognized and attempted to quantify the procyclical component of productivity growth.  But the 
nature of this behavior is not widely understood, and it does not correspond to the official dates 
at which expansions end and recessions begin.  As examined by Gordon (1993), productivity 
growth is cyclical because the change in hours of labor input lags behind changes in output, so 
that an acceleration or deceleration of output growth causes a short-run acceleration or 
deceleration of productivity growth.  In addition, the elasticity of hours growth to output growth 
(relative to the trends in both hours and output) is less than unity, implying that productivity 
grows faster than its trend whenever output grows faster than its trend.     
  Several methods are available to separate the cyclical component of productivity from its 
underlying trend.  The most straightforward method to estimate the trend in any time-series 
variable is the Hodrick-Prescott (1981) filter.
2  Figure 1 displays two different growth rates of 
output per hour for the aggregate US economy (the nonfarm private business sector).  The solid 
black line is simply a four-quarter moving average of aggregate productivity growth, while the 
                                                           
2.  Gordon’s (1993) technique was to conduct a grid search for the productivity trend that provides the best 
fit in an econometric equation relating changes in hours to lagged changes in hours and current and lagged changes 
in output.  Results using this technique on recent data yield conclusions similar to the Hodrick-Prescott results 
discussed in the text and displayed in Figure 1 and Table 2.    Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 8 
 
 
line of small black diamonds is the Hodrick-Prescott trend.
3   The trend displays a more subtle 
version of postwar productivity growth history than the simple “fast-slow-fast” version of Table 
1.  Trend growth peaked in the early 1960s, slowed down steadily until about 1980, and then 
revived in stages through the late 1990s.  Also visible in Figure 1 is an excess of actual over-
trend productivity growth in the late 1990s, a shortfall below trend growth in 2001, and then a 
resurgence to above-trend growth in early 2002. 
  Table 2 summarizes the information in Figure 1 for decades prior to 1995 and three 
intervals since 1995.  Prior to 1995 each decade exhibits small cyclical effects, alternating across 
decades.  It is interesting that a period as long as a decade is not enough to extinguish the cyclical 
effect; this depends on economic conditions in the initial and terminal years chosen for each 
decade.  Since 1995 there was a positive cyclical effect during 1995–2000, then a negative 
cyclical effect for the five quarters of slow real GDP growth between mid 2000 and 2001:Q3, 
followed by a very strong cyclical growth resurgence in the final three quarters.  The cyclical 
effect of 0.44 points for the 1995–2000 period is consistent with my previous writing, which 
argued that a significant fraction, perhaps one third, of the post-1995 productivity growth revival 
through mid-2000 could be interpreted as cyclical rather than structural.
4 
  This leaves the final upsurge of productivity growth in late 2001 and early 2002 open to 
interpretation.  Most commentators have interpreted this episode as indicating that trend growth 
                                                           
3.  Users of the Hodrick-Prescott method must specify a “smoothing parameter.”  Most users choose the 
same parameter (1600) used in the original Hodrick-Prescott research, but this yields too variable a trend that, for 
instance, exhibits a substantial decline in trend output during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  The trend 
displayed in Figure 1 uses a parameter of 6400 that imposes slightly more smoothness.  
 
4.  Based on data through 1999:Q4, Gordon (2000, Table 2, p  55) estimated a cyclical effect of 0.50 points, 
almost identical to that displayed in Table 2. 
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may have accelerated again to 2.50 or even 2.75 at an annual rate.  However, their optimism is 
countered by three historical precedents, as shown in Table 3.  Very strong productivity growth 
was registered in the first four quarters of the economic recoveries that began in early 1975, late 
1982, and early 1991, yet in each case the following two years registered dismal productivity 
growth at or below the trend rate for that period.  These precedents make it likely that in 2003-04 
productivity growth will settle back at or below its trend value of 2.25 percent per year, 
displayed in Table 2.  Stated another way, the initial quarters of a business recovery typically 
combine a jump in output growth with the lagged effect of firms to cut costs and reduce 
employment.  Only after the recovery is well underway does hiring begin in earnest. 
 
III. The Contribution of Hi-tech Investment to the Productivity Growth  Revival  
The post-1995 productivity growth revival has generated a growth industry of its own, in 
the form of academic analyses of the sources of the revival.  In this section we examine the latest 
decomposition of the sources of the revival by one of the leading research teams on this topic 
and then raise questions about their results.   
 
The Sources of Growth 
The leading studies of the interplay between ICT investment and the productivity growth 
revival are by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson (2001, 2002), and Oliner and Sichel 
(2000, 2001, 2002).  The most recent results of Oliner and Sichel are presented in Table 4.  
Fortunately, this analysis, which extends through 2001, can be examined in a straightforward 
way without any need to separate changes in trend from cyclical effects, since the Oliner-Sichel Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 10 
 
 
1995–2001 growth rate of 2.25 percent (Table 4, top line, middle column) is almost identical to 
the trend estimate for the same period in Table 2 above.
5  Stated another way, when the analysis 
includes both the positive cyclical effect for 1995–2000 and the negative cyclical effect for 2001, 
these effects exactly cancel out.   
  The Oliner-Sichel method is to start with labor productivity growth and then subtract the 
contribution of capital deepening and changes in labor quality, arriving at the growth rate of 
multifactor productivity (MFP) as a residual.  Then the location of multifactor productivity 
growth by industry is examined, and the total of MFP growth is disaggregated into the portion 
occurring in the ICT sector and a residual for other sectors.  The findings reported in Table 4 are 
very striking.  As shown in the right column, the total revival of labor productivity growth is 0.85 
points, divided into contributions of 0.55 points of ICT capital deepening, 0.43 points of 
acceleration in MFP growth in the ICT industries, –0.10 contribution of capital deepening for 
non-ICT capital, and a –0.02 contribution of the acceleration of MFP growth in the non-ICT part 
of the economy.  In short, Oliner and Sichel overexplain the post-1995 productivity growth 
revival without any reference to innovation or organizational improvements outside of the 
production and use of ICT capital.  Their conclusion coincides to an uncanny degree of precision 
with that reached more than two years earlier by Gordon (2000).
6 
 
                                                           
5.  The combined annual growth rates in Table 2 of actual and trend for the period 1995:Q4–2001:Q3 are 
both 2.17 percent, implying a cyclical effect of 0.00 percent.  
 
6.  Gordon (2000, Table 2) calculated a residual acceleration in MFP outside the ICT sector of 0.02 percent 
per year for the period ending in 1999:Q4, compared with Oliner and Sichel’s –0.02 percent per year for the period 
ending with the full year 2001.  While the time periods are different, Gordon’s residual deducted a cyclical effect for 
the period ending in 1999:Q4 that is not necessary to deduct when the time period ends in 2001. 




Has the Contribution of Hi-tech Investment been Exaggerated? 
The Oliner-Sichel results do not imply that the only “action” in the economy has been 
located in sectors making computers, servers, peripherals, routers, software, and fiber-optic 
cable.  Their contribution from the use of ICT equipment (0.55 points in Table 4) is higher than 
their contribution from the production of ICT equipment (0.43 points).   There has clearly been 
great dynamism in some industrial sectors that make heavy use of computers.  Numerous studies, 
especially Triplett and Bosworth (2002) and Nordhaus (2002b), pinpoint wholesale and retail 
trade and securities trading as the industries outside of ICT manufacturing where the productivity 
growth revival is most evident. 
Four related and complementary issues lead us to question whether the Oliner-Sichel 
methodology attributes too much of the post-1995 productivity growth revival to the use of ICT 
equipment (we have no quibble with their calculations of the contribution of ICT production. 
First, the Oliner-Sichel technique requires that the full productivity payoff from the use of 
computers occurs at the exact moment that the computer is produced.
7  Leaving aside any delay 
between production and installation, they assume that the computer produces its ultimate 
productivity benefit on the first day of use.  Numerous observers, led by David (1990), argue 
instead that there is a substantial time delay necessary for firms to make the organizational 
changes needed to take advantage of new hardware and software.   If there is a substantial delay 
in the real world that is not taken into account by the Oliner-Sichel method, then they exaggerate 
the contribution of ICT capital-deepening to the post-1995 revival.  A corollary is that, in years 
                                                           
7.  Recall that the GDP statistics on which they rely measure output by production and treat any unsold 
goods as inventory accumulation, a part of GDP. Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 12 
 
 
such as 2001 and 2002 when ICT investment has declined, there are substantial leftover benefits 
from the previous ICT boom of the late 1990s that may support productivity growth even if ICT 
investment remains in a slump. 
  A second qualification relates to the robust productivity revival recorded in the retail 
sector, noted by Triplett-Bosworth (2002), Nordhaus (2002b), and others.  This was concentrated 
in “large stores offering a wide array of goods accompanied by low prices and relatively high use 
of self-service systems” (Sieling, Friedman, and Dumas 2001, p 10).  A complementary finding 
by Foster et al. (2002) based on a study of individual retail establishments shows that all of the 
retail productivity growth (not just the revival but the entire measured amount of productivity 
growth in the 1990s) can be attributed to more productive entering establishments that displaced 
less productive existing establishments.  The average establishment that continued in business 
exhibited zero productivity growth, and this despite the massive investment of the retail industry 
in ICT equipment such as bar-code scanners that presumably went to both old and new 
establishments.  In the Foster results, productivity growth reflects the greater efficiency of newly 
opened stores, and the Sieling comment implies that most of these highly efficient new stores are 
large discount operations, the proverbial “big boxes” such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Best Buy, 
Circuit City, and new large supermarkets.   
  But the Sieling and Foster findings seem to conflict with the Oliner-Sichel implication 
that all of the productivity revival in retailing was achieved by purchasing new computers, 
software, and communications equipment.  All retailers, whether new establishments of the 
1990s or older establishments of the 1980s or prior decades, have adopted ICT technology.  Bar-
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code readers have become universal in new and old stores.  The check-out process at Home 
Depot involves laser bar-code readers that operate identically to the bar-code readers in the 
ancient hardware store that I patronize in my home town of Evanston, Illinois, for example.
8  It is 
likely that the productivity revival in retailing associated with newly built “big box” stores 
involves far more than the use of computers, including large size, economies of scale, efficient 
design to allow large-volume unloading from delivery trucks, stacking of merchandise on tall 
racks with fork-lift trucks, and large-scale purchases taken by customers in shopping carts to 
vehicles in adjacent open parking lots.   
  In the taxonomy of Table 4, these sources of efficiency gains should count as a 
contribution of non-ICT capital (ie, big-box structures and fork-lift trucks) and organizational 
improvements that raise MFP in the non-ICT sector.  The possibility that Oliner-Sichel 
exaggerate the role of ICT capital deepening, or indeed of ICT gains in MFP, would imply that 
the residual role of non-ICT MFP growth is greater than it appears from Table 4.  One may 
speculate that computers in reality earned less than the competitive rate of return assumed by 
Oliner-Sichel, and that non-ICT capital earned more than a competitive rate of return.  This or 
some other related discrepancy between reality and the Oliner-Sichel framework would be 
necessary to reconcile their results with those of Foster, and this possibility may extend beyond 
retailing to the wholesale trade and securities trading sectors, where impressive productivity 
gains have also been recorded.   
  The third reason to doubt the Oliner-Sichel decomposition is provided in a recent paper 
                                                           
8.  Virtually the only remaining traditional hardware store in Evanston, Lemoi Hardware advertises that it 
is “Evanston’s oldest store, established in 1896.”  Fortunately, it is heavily patronized, stocked to the rafters with 
every conceivable type of merchandise, and is currently expanding its floor space by 60 percent. Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 14 
 
 
by Daveri and Mascotto, who develop data on productivity growth by U. S. states.  They agree 
with Oliner-Sichel that the production of IT equipment was a central component of the late 
1990s productivity growth revival but they find no evidence that the use of IT equipment made a 
contribution.  More specifically, they find that the productivity growth revival mostly occurred in 
those states that are “intensive in the production of IT goods and services as well as of non-IT 
durable goods.  When those states are excluded from the sample, the remaining states do not 
exhibit any significant acceleration in producdtivity.  In particular, the association between 
productivity and gains and IT use is at best weak at the state level” (Daveri-Mascotto, 2002).  
This finding is complementary to our conclusion reached above that the productivity revival in 
retailing involved factors other than the use of IT, and brings us to the fourth and final reason to 
doubt the Oliner-Sichel results, namely the divergent productivity growth experiences of the 
United States and Europe. 
 
IV.   The Puzzling Contrast between the United States and Europe 
If the decomposition of growth sources is a booming academic industry on the west side 
of the Atlantic, laments about Europe’s performance are the corresponding concern of academics 
on the east side of the Atlantic. Although the United States enjoyed a productivity growth revival 
after 1995, a growth deceleration occurred in numerous European countries as well as in the 
European Union as a whole.  How could ICT be the main source of the US growth revival, as 
described in the work of Oliner-Sichel summarized in Table 4 above, while Europe fell behind?  
Business firms, not to mention university professors, use the same PCs and Microsoft software 
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everywhere in Europe, bar-code scanners are widely used in European retailing, and most 
European countries are ahead of the U. S. in the penetration of mobile telephones.  
  Part of the European puzzle is resolved when we recognize that heterogeneity among 
European countries is more pronounced than the difference between the European Union and the 
United States. Numerous studies have shown a relatively strong positive correlation between 
MFP growth and measures of ICT intensity, for example, the ratio of ICT expenditure to GDP or 
the change in PC intensity per 100 inhabitants over the 1990s.  In such comparisons, numerous 
countries achieve higher MFP growth rates than the United States over the 1990s—these 
countries include Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and Australia.  Some, 
but not all, of these countries surpass the United States in PC intensity and/or in the share of ICT 
expenditure.  What differs most between Europe and the United States is the low level of PC 
adoption and ICT expenditure in the “olive belt” ranging from Portugal and Spain in the west to 
Italy and Greece in the east.
9  The contrast between the Nordic and olive-belt countries suggests 
irreverent comments about how Scandinavians in their dark winters find PCs more appealing 
than do olive-belt residents cavorting on their sunny beaches. 
  Contrasts within Europe also suggest that perhaps we could try to disaggregate the United 
States to provide a more appropriate comparison with Europe.  Silicon Valley could be compared 
with Ireland and Finland; New England could be compared with Denmark and Sweden; Texas 
with Australia, and the midwestern heartland with France and Germany.  What stands out in this 
suggestion is the absence of any US equivalent for the European olive-belt countries.  Political 
                                                           
9.  Scatter plots supporting these correlations between MFP growth and computer intensity are presented in 
Bartelsman et al. (2002, Figures 8 and 9). 
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borders are a product of history, and perhaps the United States would look more like Europe, 
which includes the olive belt, if we were to aggregate US data with those for the “tequila belt” 
(Mexico).  
  Quantitative evidence that provides our third reason to doubt the Oliner-Sichel results is 
provided by van Ark et. al. (2002).  As shown in Table 5, van Ark supports the widespread 
impression that America accelerated while Europe fell behind.  The top line in Table 5 shows 
that US productivity growth accelerated by 1.1 percent in the late 1990s while European growth 
decelerated by 0.9 percent, a mirror-image performance.  An initial caveat is that Europe looks 
much better when the two halves of the 1990s are aggregated into a single 1990–2000 period; 
European productivity growth for 1990–2000 averages out to 1.95 percent per year, considerably 
higher than US growth of 1.65 percent per year.  Note that these numbers for the U. S. differ 
from previous tables by covering the entire economy (GDP) rather than the nonfarm private 
business sector.   
  The van Ark study allows us to trace the location of productivity growth accelerations 
and decelerations to particular industrial sectors, divided into ICT-producing, ICT-using, and 
non-ICT industries.  As we have already seen in Table 4, there has been no productivity revival 
in US industries that are classified as neither ICT-producing nor ICT-using, and this is confirmed 
on the bottom line of Table 5 for the United States. These industries are also the core of the 
European problem, exhibiting a deceleration in the late 1990s greater than the deceleration of the 
European economy as a whole.  Surprisingly, ICT-producing industries exhibited both higher 
productivity growth and a greater acceleration in the late 1990s in Europe than in the United 
States. The core of the US success story appears to have been in ICT-using industries—that is, Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 17 
 
 
the same retail, wholesale, and securities trading industries already discussed.  A separate 
analysis by van Ark et al. (2002, Figure 2a) shows that literally all of the productivity growth 
differential of the United States over Europe in the late 1990s came from these three industries, 
with retail contributing about 55 percent of the differential, wholesale 24 percent, and securities 
trading 20 percent.  The remaining industries had small positive or negative differentials, netting 
out to zero.  As might have been expected, the United States–Europe differential was negative in 
telecom services, reflecting US backwardness in mobile phones.   
  These results for Europe bring together our discussion of retailing in the previous section 
and here as a major factor explaining Europe’s poor performance in the late 1990s.  Just as we 
argued earlier that the US retailing sector has achieved efficiency gains for reasons not directly 
related to computers, including physical investments in a new type of “big box” organization, so 
we can suggest in parallel that Europe has fallen back because European firms are much less free 
to develop the “big box” retail formats.
10  Impediments include land use regulations that prevent 
the carving out of new “greenfield” sites for “big box” stores in suburban and exurban locations, 
shop-closing regulations that restrict the revenue potential of new investments, congestion in 
central-city locations that are near the nodes of Europe’s extensive urban public transit systems, 
and restrictive labor rules that limit flexibility in organizing the workplace and make it expensive 
to hire and fire workers with the near-total freedom to which US firms are accustomed.  
  When confronted with this evidence, Europeans raise a broad set of issues that extend 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Far from praising American land-use planning (or lack of 
                                                           
10.  Any generalizations here about “Europe” must be qualified by differences across countries.  The 
Germans until recently were notorious for restrictive shop-closing hours, while the French firm Carrefour and the 
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planning) that facilitates the growth of suburban “big box” stores, they praise their own densely 
populated central cities with their proliferation of small individually owned shops.  Some defend 
small-scale European retail formats by praising an alleged European “taste for variety” that 
differs from their image of the United States as a homogenous country in which everyone eats 
Wonder Bread.  Americans would respond that chains like Whole Foods routinely sell at least 60 
different types of bread every day, and that the variety of light bulbs, tools, and fastening devices 
in a typical American Home Depot would dazzle any European looking for variety.  While 
admiring the pedestrian walkways of European cities from Stockholm to Frankfurt to Lisbon, 
one is faced with a difficult tradeoff between urban amenities and raw productivity, that is, retail 
real value added per hour.   
  In conclusion we have found four separate reasons to suspect that the Oliner-Sichel 
methodology overstates the role of IT investment as a source of the post-1995 productivity 
growth revival:  (1) the likely delay in the impact in the productivity payoff of IT investment, in 
contrast to the instantaneous payoff assumed by Oliner-Sichel;  (2) the micro evidence on U. S. 
retailing that shows a productivity revival only in new establishments and no productivity growth 
in older establishments, despite their extensive use of computer technology; (3) the cross-state 
evidence showing no productivity revival in states that are intensive in computer use; and (4) the 
gap between the growth rate of retailing productivity in the U. S. and Europe despite the use of 
computer technology on both sides of the Atlantic.  Overall, we conclude that ICT investment 
has been exaggerated as the sole source of the US productivity revival of the late 1990s, and it is 
even clearer that lack of ICT investment has been wrongly cited as the main source of the 
contrasting productivity performance in Europe.  Since the Oliner-Sichel procedure obtains a Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 19 
 
 
large contribution of computer use by assuming that computer capital has the same rate of return 
as other capital, their apparent exaggeration of the impact of computer use on productivity 
growth may imply indirectly that computer investment in the late 1990s had a sub-par rate of 
return, and in fact we know that the hardware and software purchased and developed by failed 
dotcoms had a negative rate of return. 
 
V.  Positive Feedback Loops among the ICT Investment Boom, the Stock 
Market, Low Inflation, and Monetary Policy  
 
  We have now examined the extent to which the post-1995 productivity growth revival 
may have contained a cyclical component, how much of it can be attributed to the boom in ICT 
investment, whether standard estimates of ICT’s contribution may have been exaggerated, and 
why Europe did not experience a productivity growth revival.  Whether the ICT investment 
boom was the sole cause of the US productivity growth revival or only a very large cause, there 
is no doubt that the ICT investment boom deserves substantial credit for the productivity growth 
revival.  Accordingly, the future growth of productivity will depend at least in part on whether 
ICT investment soon returns to growth rates typical of the late 1990s or settles down to much 
slower growth rates, perhaps even slower than in the 1987 –1995 period.   
  We now turn to the core of this paper, which is to identify unsustainable sources of the 
ICT investment boom of the late 1990s.  All of these sources fall under the general heading 
suggested by the paper’s subtitle, “Does Supply Create its own Demand?”  We treat the 
geometric increase in computer power as a given, and attempt to identify the sources of the 
robust demand for computer power in the late 1990s that might not recur in the future. These fall 
into two general categories: macroeconomic and microeconomic.  The macro sources of demand Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 20 
 
 
are described as a multidimensional feedback loop in which the ICT investment boom interacted 
positively with the stock market, inflation behavior, and monetary policy.  The micro sources of 
demand are traced to particular events in the evolution of telephone equipment, computer 
hardware, and software technology. 
 
The Hi-tech Investment Boom 
The late 1990s were notable both for an amazing acceleration in the growth of real 
computer investment and for a simultaneous acceleration in the rate of price decline of computer 
power.  In fact, one hypothesis is that the investment boom simply reflected the faster rate of 
price decline.  The dimensions of this phenomenon are illustrated in Figure 2.  Plotted on the 
same scale are four-quarter growth rates of real investment in computers and peripherals and the 
change in the deflator for the same category of equipment.  The upper (solid) line is the real 
investment series, with growth rates accelerating from 19 percent per year during 1987–1995 to 
33 percent per year between mid 1995 and mid 2000.  During the two years following mid 2000, 
the growth rate decelerated sharply to 4.6 percent per annum, well below the average of 1987–
1995.   
  The lower (dashed) line is the growth rate of the computer deflator, with a rate of change 
accelerating from around –15 percent per year before 1995 to between –30 and –35 percent per 
year during 1995–1999, followed by a return closer to the pre-1995 growth rates.  Was the 
investment boom simply the counterpart of the accelerated rate of price decline?  If the boom 
reflected only substitution with a price elasticity of unity, then nominal spending on computers 
would not have increased..  As shown in Figure 3, the investment boom went beyond that.  
Computer investment as a share of nominal GDP was not constant in the late 1990s, but rather Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 21 
 
 
jumped after 1995 from about 0.75 percent to close to 1.0 percent before falling back to 0.7 
percent in 2001–2002.  The drop in the nominal computer share in 2001–2002 reminds us that a 
rapid rate of price decline for high-tech equipment is not enough to guarantee a continuous 
investment boom; if the demand is not there, then the nominal share can decline as prices 
continue to fall relative to prices in the rest of the economy.  
  The phrase New Economy became widely adopted to describe the US macroeconomic 
miracle of the late 1990s, and definitions of the New Economy centered not just on the 
productivity growth revival but also on the burst of growth in high-tech investment visible in 
Figure 2.  In fact it became common in the late 1990s for some commentators (see Gordon 2000) 
to treat the accelerated rate of price decline of computers as the defining characteristic of the 
New Economy.  However, this emphasis on the rate of price decline implicitly treats the 
acceleration of technological change in high-tech equipment as both necessary and sufficient to 
generate an investment boom and a productivity revival.  As we shall see, a technological 
acceleration in supply does not guarantee that the demand for all that equipment will emerge, and 
in this sense any definition of the New Economy has to include innovation both in computer 
technology and in new uses for computers. 
  Thus far we have emphasized the computer part of ICT investment to the exclusion of 
software and telecom investment, mainly because the price deflators for computers are much 
better than those for software and telecom (where the rate of price decline is generally assumed 
to be understated).
11  However, deflators do not matter for nominal shares, and we see in Figure 
4 that the nominal share of all ICT investment (computers, peripherals, software, and telecom) 
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experienced more robust growth than for computers alone in the 1990s.  While the computer 
share in Figure 3 fell back in 2001–2002 to its level of 1984, the share of all ICT investment in 
2001–2002 was a full percentage point higher than in the mid-1980s, although more than half a 
point below its peak of 1999–2000.   Why did the prior upsurge in the ICT investment share in 
the 1980s not create a productivity revival like that of the late 1990s?  This is one of several 
circumstantial pieces of evidence implying that the role of ICT investment in the late 1990s 
productivity revival, as argued above,  may have been exaggerated in analyses like that of Oliner 
and Sichel as summarized in Table 4. 
 
Pillar of the Positive-feedback Loop:  the Stock Market 
Whatever the rate of price decline in computer equipment, as displayed in the bottom 
frame of Figure 2, the growth rate of real investment depended crucially on the sources of 
demand for computers and other types of ICT investment.  This growth rate was increased by the 
stock market boom, both directly through the role of stock market finance in helping old and new 
firms alike buy massive amounts of ICT equipment, and also through the role of the stock market 
in propelling overall economic growth through the wealth effect on consumption expenditures.     
  The S&P 500 stock market average exactly tripled from May 1995 to March 2000 and 
then fell by almost half by October 2002.
12  This reflected in large part the marked increase in 
corporate profits at roughly the same time.  The most widely watched measure of profits refers to 
the reported profits of the S&P 500 companies, an amount that roughly quadrupled from about 
$125 billion in 1991 to about $500 billion in mid-2000 before collapsing to around $200 billion 
                                                           
12.  The monthly average of the S&P 500 index for May 1995 was 508, and the peak reached on March 24, 
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in late 2001.  If the S&P measure of reported profits were the only available measure, there 
would be no mystery surrounding either the stock market boom or its collapse, since the S&P 
index increased and then decreased by roughly the same percentage as profits.  However, as 
pointed out by Nordhaus (2002a), several other profit measures show different timing, 
particularly the national accounts (NIPA) measure that peaks much earlier, in 1997 rather than in 
2000, and which decreases much less than the S&P series from 2000 to late 2001.
13  If market 
investors had been watching NIPA profits rather than S&P profits, the stock market might not 
have increased as much in 1997–2000 nor declined nearly as much after 2000.  Nordhaus 
speculates that the much later peak in S&P profits may have reflected creative accounting 
schemes of the type that have created the recent crisis in US corporate governance involving 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, and others.   
  If the S&P 500 stock market index simply echoed reported S&P earnings, however 
misleading or inaccurate these may have been, then the stock market boom of the late 1990s was 
not a “bubble,” since it was based on a fundamental factor, namely the perceived value of S&P 
earnings.  Although the price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 did increase substantially between 
1995 and 2000, most of this can be explained by a decline in the real interest rate on bonds.  
Nordhaus (2002a, Figure 8) shows that the spread between the return on equities (the inverse of 
the price-earnings ratio) and the real interest rate on government bonds was only slightly lower 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
13.  Nordhaus (2002a, Figure 5) displays four different measures of profits.  There are two S&P indexes, 
both including and excluding accounting changes, discontinued operations, extraordinary items, and special items.  
The measure discussed in the text is reported S&P profits, which includes all these items.  There are also two NIPA 
indexes, including and excluding an inventory valuation adjustment and capital consumption allowances, and the 
measure discussed in the text includes such adjustments.  Major differences in the NIPA indexes compared with the 
S&P include their greater comprehensiveness in applying to the entire economy, exclusion of capital gains, basis on 
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in 2000 than it was in 1992 or in 1985–1987.   
  In contemplating the future of the stock market, and hence one of the critical components 
of the positive-feedback mechanism of the late 1990s, we must assess the future of all three 
components of the Nordhaus spread: the profits, the price-earnings ratio, and the real interest rate 
on government bonds.  During the prosperous 1960–1973 period, the spread was in the range of 
3 to 4 percent, followed by the depressed and inflationary 1973–1983 period with spreads 
ranging from 5 to 14 percent.  In contrast, the spread after 1984, except for a short period in 
1989, was in the narrow range of –1 to 2 percent.  In fact, the collapse in stock prices through 
October 2002, together with the decline in bond yields, brought the spread back up to at least 4, 
as high as at any time since 1984.  At that point the market had itself corrected the widespread 
perception of irrational exuberance.   
  Could the spread go back to the range of 0 to 2 percent that has characterized most of the 
post-1984 period?  Another way to pose this question is to ask whether the 1963–1973, 1973–
1983, or post-1984 periods are more relevant to post-2002 stock market spreads and hence 
prices. An important change that can be dated to 1983–1984 is a decline in macroeconomic 
volatility, as measured by various volatility measures of real GDP growth (Blanchard and Simon 
2001); this would be expected to decrease the spread between stock and bond yields.  Another 
factor working in the same direction has been the shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution pension plans, leading many workers to make regular monthly investments in 
equities independent of the current state of the stock market.   
  The previous discussion suggests that the spread could well decline from its value of mid-
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October 2002 of about 4 percent back toward the 0-to-2 percent range that has been the norm 
since 1984.  Interest rates on bonds in late 2002 are abnormally low and could plausibly increase 
by more than any hypothetical future increase in inflation (discussed below).  As Nordhaus 
shows, S&P reported profits have been abnormally low in 2001–2002 as the dirty linen of 
creative accounting has been cleansed.  Future S&P profits may bounce back substantially as this 
one-time element disappears, even if economic profits do not change appreciably as a share of 
GDP.
14  This discussion on causes of the stock market boom of the late 1990s concludes that the 
bubble element of prices has been squeezed out and that substantial stock market returns for the 
period after October, 2002, are quite likely.    
  The effects of the late 1990s stock market boom are easier to describe than its causes.  
Easy stock market finance fueled start-up companies and the expansion of existing high-tech 
companies.  New companies with only vague business plans and remote prospects for profit were 
flooded with funds from aggressive venture capital firms and then proceeded to initial public 
offerings (IPOs) that have since become notorious for providing privileged insiders and friends 
of brokerage houses with opportunities for guaranteed first-day gains at the expense of ordinary 
investors.  The heady optimism as market participants anticipated unending gains (“Dow 
36,000”) doubtless led to more finance being shoveled into ICT investment than would otherwise 
have occurred; the abuses since discovered, as well as the collapse in high-tech stocks, make it 
unlikely that this supporting component of the ICT investment boom will recur in the foreseeable 
                                                           
14.  Nordhaus (2002a, Figure 6) shows that reported S&P profits were not unusually high as a percent of 
GDP at the 2000 peak and indeed were lower at that peak than in virtually every year between 1960 and 1980.  This 
suggests that a substantial rebound in S&P profits relative to GDP from the 2001–2002 lows is quite likely.  
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future, if ever in our lifetimes.
15 
  The ICT investment boom was propelled not just by the stock market but also by the 
prosperity of the overall economy, feeding back to investment as part of the standard 
“accelerator” effect.  One impetus to economy-wide growth was a two-step feedback from the 
stock market to ICT investment, working through the wealth effect of the stock market on 
consumption expenditures.  This connection is most vividly illustrated by Figure 5, which 
compares the household savings rate (dashed line, right scale) with the ratio of the S&P 500 
stock market index to nominal GDP (solid line, left scale).  This S&P ratio more than doubled in 
the four years between 1995 and 1999, after declining by two thirds between 1965 and 1982.  
The negative correlation between the stock market ratio and the household savings rate is evident 
in the data and is just what would be expected as a result of the wealth effect embedded in 
Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis of consumption behavior.  Rapid economic growth in the late 
1990s was fueled not just by the ICT investment boom, but also by a consumption binge 
financed by capital gains that allowed consumption expenditures to grow more rapidly than 
personal disposable income for four straight years.  Another source of positive feedback came 
from the rest of the world outside of the United States.  The stock market boom attracted foreign 
investment that financed the US current account deficit, and this allowed US consumers to 
expand their purchases of imports far faster than the rest of the world was willing to buy US 
exports.  The resulting appreciation of the US dollar played its own role in the positive-feedback 
mechanism, as it was the most important single source of the surprisingly low rate of inflation 
                                                           
15.  One is reminded of the famous and chilling remark of the British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey on 
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experienced by the United States in the late 1990s. 
 
Low Inflation Enabled Easy Monetary Policy  
Low inflation in the late 1990s allowed monetary policy to avoid a move toward the 
restrictive spike in short-term interest rates that had ended previous expansions in 1969, 1981, 
and 1989.  The nature of the inflationary surprise is evident in Figure 6, which plots the 
unemployment rate on the same scale as the inflation rate for the personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE) deflator.
16  The unemployment rate in 1999–2000 fell to 4 percent, the 
lowest rate since 1966–1970, yet in 1998 and early 1999, inflation not only failed to accelerate 
but actually decelerated. 
  Taking a general view of the unemployment-inflation relationship, it appears 
superficially that the only support for a negative Phillips-curve unemployment-inflation tradeoff 
is based on the 1960s Vietnam-era experience, with a bit of further support from the economic 
expansion of 1987–1990.  In other periods, especially during 1972–1985 and 1995–1999, the 
unemployment and inflation rates appear to be positively correlated, with the unemployment rate 
behaving as a lagging indicator, moving a year or two later than inflation. Although this 
appearance of a positive tradeoff led some economists—notably Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and 
Thomas Sargent—in the 1970s to declare the Phillips curve to be “lying in wreckage,” at the 
same time a more general model of inflation determination was developed that combined an 
influence of demand (ie, a negative short-run relation between inflation and unemployment), 
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Accounts, is preferable to the Consumer Price Index, because it has been revised retrospectively to use a consistent 
set of measurement methods, whereas the CPI is never revised.   
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supply (in the form of “supply shocks” such as changing real oil prices that created a positive 
inflation-unemployment relation), slow inertial adjustment, and long-run independence of 
inflation and the unemployment rate.
17  During the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, this 
more general model was adopted as the mainstream approach to inflation determination by 
textbook authors and policymakers alike, but in the 1997-99 period it was challenged again by 
the simultaneous decline in unemployment and deceleration of inflation evident in Figure 6. 
  At the end of the decade, no consensus had yet emerged to explain the positive 
correlation of inflation and unemployment in the late 1990s.  I have attempted (1998) to use a 
common framework to explain why the performance of the 1970s was so bad and the 
performance of the 1990s was so good, pointing to the role of adverse supply shocks in the 
earlier episode and beneficial supply shocks more recently.  The first beneficial shock was the 
post-1995 productivity growth revival, which directly reduced the growth in unit labor costs, and 
hence inflation, for any given growth rate of nominal wages.  If there was a substantial lag in the 
response of nominal wage changes to faster productivity growth, then the productivity revival 
contributed directly to lower inflation.   
  The second and third beneficial shocks were the familiar “old” supply shocks, the falling 
real prices of imports and energy.  Of these by far the most important was the declining real price 
of imports that was a counterpart to the appreciation of the dollar over the entire period between 
1995 and early 2002.  I have estimated (1998) that in early 1998 inflation was being held down 
by more than 1 percent at an annual rate by the behavior of real import prices.  The role of real 
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energy prices was short-lived, having its maximum impact in holding down inflation in early 
1998.  Productivity, import prices, and energy prices were joined by two “new” supply shocks: 
the accelerating decline in computer prices (see Figure 2 above) and a sharp decline in the prices 
of medical care services made possible by the managed health care revolution.   
  The confluence of this set of five beneficial supply shocks was central to the longevity of 
the boom of the 1990s.  Low inflation allowed the Fed to pursue a very different monetary policy 
than in the late 1980s.  Yet none of the beneficial shocks was guaranteed to last forever.  Indeed, 
the first to disappear was the energy price effect, which turned around and accounted for most of 
the doubling of inflation in the price deflator for personal consumption expenditures (plotted in 
Figure 6) from 1.1 percent in 1998 to 2.6 percent in 2000.
 18   
  If low inflation in the late 1990s was mainly caused by the beneficial supply shocks, and 
low inflation in 2001–2002 was caused by a weakening of demand in product and labor markets, 
what are the prospects for inflation when the economy recovers?  This is relevant to the overall 
themes of this paper, because if there is a substantial risk that inflation will reignite, the response 
of monetary policy may look more like the late 1980s than the late 1990s, and any substantial 
upward movement of interest rates on bonds would throw cold water on housing and car sales, 
on housing refinance, and on any incipient stock market recovery. 
  A case can be made that, in addition to energy prices, all four of the remaining supply 
shocks that shifted in a beneficial direction in the late 1990s may turn in the adverse direction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
18.  Measures of “core inflation” that exclude food and energy prices exhibited only a negligible 
acceleration from 1998 to 2000, but these core measures are influenced by the other beneficial shocks discussed in 
this section—namely the productivity revival, the decline of real import prices, the temporary cessation of medical 
care inflation, and the accelerated rate of decline of computer prices. 
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and indeed may already have done so.  Even if productivity growth remains strong, eventually 
real wage growth will recognize and absorb the productivity growth revival.  Indeed, this had 
already happened in the late 1990s, as annual growth in real compensation per hour accelerated 
from a mere 0.7 percent during 1992–1998 to 2.8 percent during 1998–2000.
19  The beneficial 
role of falling real import prices has already greatly lessened in impact, from an annual rate of 
decline of –3.3 percent per year in 1992–1998 to –1.2 percent per year in 1998–2002.  A 
continuing decline in real import prices is unlikely, as the dollar has begun to decline from its 
peak reached early in the year 2002. 
  Perhaps the greatest single concern for the future of inflation involves medical care 
prices.  Between 1993 and 1996 medical care inflation exhibited a sharp deceleration from 
roughly double the economy-wide inflation rate to a number almost equal to the overall inflation 
rate.  Yet recently the inflation rate of the personal consumption deflator for medical care has 
begun to creep up, from 2.1 percent in 1999, to 2.9 percent in 2000, to 3.6 percent in 2001, 
relative to an overall inflation rate in 2001 of only 2.0 percent.  This  may be the tip of the 
iceberg, however, because health care prices are once again becoming a leading edge of 
inflation.  The growth rate of one index of health insurance premiums decelerated from 18 
percent in 1989 to 0.8 percent in 1996, only to reaccelerate again to 13 percent in 2002.
20   The 
final beneficial shock of the late 1990s was the more rapid rate of decline in computer prices, and 
we have already seen (in Figure 2) that the rate of price decline retreated from –30 percent per 
year in 1995–1999 to an average rate of about –20 percent in 1999–2002.       
                                                           
19.  The growth rate of real compensation per hour subsequently slowed back to 0.7 percent per year 
between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q2. 
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  The response of the Fed’s monetary policy is summarized in Figure 7, which compares 
quarterly values of the Federal funds rate with the output ratio or “gap”—that is, the ratio of 
actual to potential real GDP.  The gap is a commonly used measure how much actual output 
differs from potential output, i.e., the amount the economy is capable of producing without 
generating extra inflation.  As shown by the right scale, the output ratio rose above 100 percent 
both in 1988–1990 and in 1997–2000, but the response of the Fed was quite different.  In the 
episode of the late 1980s, the Fed responded to excess output by quickly tightening policy and 
creating a spike in the Federal funds rate to 9.25 percent in early 1989.  In the late 1990s, the 
output ratio rose above 100 percent for a longer period and to a higher level, but the Fed barely 
touched the Federal funds rate, which varied only in the range of 4.5 to 6.5 percent during the 
entire period between early 1995 and late 2000.  The distance between the two lines in Figure 7 
during the period 1997–2000 can be interpreted as showing the influence of low inflation on 
monetary policy, and hence low inflation as an enabler of the continued output boom.  Once 
again, there was a positive feedback system, with relatively low interest rates fostering ICT 
investment and the productivity revival, and the productivity revival feeding back to make its 
own contribution toward keeping inflation low. 
 
VI.  The Interplay of Supply and Demand in the ICT Investment Boom 
We have now seen that the ICT investment boom of the late 1990s, although initially 
stimulated by technological advances that pushed the price of computer power downward more 
rapidly than before, did not occur in isolation.  In addition to the pure technological stimulus, 
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ICT investment was funded by ample finance made possible by the stock market boom and 
relatively easy monetary policy, and ICT investment responded to the boom in the overall 
economy, which in turn reflected positive feedback among the productivity revival, the 
beneficial shocks that held down inflation, and low interest rates.  Stated another way, if the 
initial technological stimulus had not been supported by the positive macro feedback loop, a 
given rate of decline in computer prices would have been accompanied by less real ICT 
investment and a lower share of nominal ICT investment in nominal GDP than the actual ratio 
displayed in Figure 3. 
  But there is another requirement necessary for a technological advance to result in an 
investment boom and an increased share of computer spending in nominal GDP.  There must be 
a use, that is, a demand, for all that extra computer power.  A unique element of the late 1990s is 
that technological advances in the manufacture of computers coincided with new stimuli to the 
demand for computers, including but not limited to the invention of the WWW.  This 
interdependence of supply and demand is missed by commentators, such as Jorgenson, who see a 
simple chain of causation between information technology as an input and economic 
performance as an output: “ . . . the foundation for the American growth resurgence is the 
development and deployment of semiconductors” (Jorgenson 2001, p 1). 
 
Moore’s Law and the Explosion of Supply 
The specific technological event that made the growth resurgence possible was an 
acceleration in technical change in the manufacture of microprocessors, the computer chips that 
provide a computer’s computation capacity.  The idea of a product cycle in computer chips is 
summarized by “Moore’s Law,” a name later given to a 1969 observation by Gordon E. Moore, Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 33 
 
 
one of the two founders of the Intel Corporation, that each new microprocessor chip contained 
twice as many transistors as the previous generation and was released within 18 to 24 months of 
its predecessor.  This implied a logarithmic growth rate of computing capacity at between 35 and 
47 percent per year.  Rarely if ever has any scientist been so accurate in forecasting the future 
development of an innovative process.  The actual price of computer memory chips declined by 
40.9 percent per year during 1974–1996.  The price of logic chips, a narrower category more 
directly comparable to computer microprocessors, declined during 1985–1996 at 54.1 percent 
per year, followed by an acceleration to a rate of price decline of more than 90 percent per year.  
As characterized by Jorgenson (2001), “the semiconductor industry shifted from a three-year-
product cycle to a greatly accelerated two-year cycle.” 
  The calendar of product cycles and Moore’s Law may seem confusing at first, because 
the pre-1995 schedule in which the number of transistors doubled every 18 months seems to 
conflict with the idea of a three-year product cycle.  This apparent conflict is reconciled by the 
fact that each new generation of chips produced an increase in computation power by more than 
a factor of two—it is rather more like a factor of four.
21  If the shortening of the product cycle 
from three years to two was an ephemeral phenomenon of the late 1990s, then this is one more 
reason to expect that an ICT investment boom on the same scale will not recur.  In the rest of this 
paper,  we will assume that the faster two-year cycle continues for at least another decade.  The 
issue, then, is whether there is sufficient demand for computation power to absorb an increase in 
                                                           
21.  The arithmetic of Moore’s Law can be better understood as related to the fact that the natural logarithm 
of 1.0 is 0 and of 2.0 is 0.7.  Thus a doubling of computation power raises the logarithm by 0.7, which represents a 
logarithmic growth rate of 46.7 percent over 18 months or 1.5 years.  At that rate, the logarithm of computation 
power over 3 years increases by 1.4, or by a factor of 4.0 (the antilogarithm or exponent of 1.4).  
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Why the Demand for ICT Power Matters  
Whether Moore’s Law proceeds with a cycle time of two years or three years, there is no 
doubt that future progress will provide an unbelievable further explosion of computer power 
beyond what already existed at the peak of the ICT investment boom in mid 2000.  But, as we 
have seen, a rapid decline in the price of computer power does not guarantee a robust expansion 
in ICT investment.  An annual rate of decline in computer prices of, say, 30 percent per year 
could be accompanied by an annual rate of growth of real computer investment of +60 percent, 
+30 percent, 0, or –30 percent.  Growth of real investment in this example of +30 percent would 
imply no change in nominal computer investment.  Any lower growth rate in real investment, 
whether 0, –30, or any number between, would imply a sharp decline in the share of ICT 
investment in nominal GDP, as has already occurred between 2000 and 2002.  It is this 
possibility of a continuing decline in the share of ICT investment in nominal GDP that creates 
the sharpest divide between the economic environment of the late 1990s and the next few years.  
The evolution of the price and quantity of computer power can be displayed in a simple 
theoretical diagram, as in Figure 8.  Throughout its history, the economics of the computer has 
featured a steady downward shift in the supply curve of computer attributes at a rate much faster 
than the upward shift in the demand for computer services.  In fact, the story is often told with a 
theoretical diagram like the top frame of Figure 8, in which the supply curve slides steadily 
                                                           
22.  With a product cycle of two years, computation power quadruples every two years and doubles every 
12 months.  Any variable that doubles in one year must increase by a factor of 1,024 over one decade. Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 35 
 
 
downwards from S1 to S2 with no shift in the demand curve at all.
23  Ignoring the possibility of a 
rightward shift in the demand curve (we return to this possibility below), the second 
distinguishing feature of the development of the computer industry is the unprecedented speed 
with which diminishing returns set in; while computer users steadily enjoy an increasing amount 
of consumer surplus as the price falls, the declining point of intersection of the supply curve with 
the fixed demand curve implies a rapid decline in the marginal utility or benefit of computer 
power. 
The accelerated rate of price decline in computer attributes has been accompanied since 
1995 by the invention of the Internet.
24  In perhaps the most rapid diffusion of any invention 
since television in the late 1940s and early 1950s, by the end of the year 2000 the percentage of 
American households hooked up to the Internet reached 50 percent.  Surely the invention of web 
browsers and the explosive growth of e-commerce should be interpreted as a rightward shift in 
the demand curve in the top frame of Figure 8 from D1 to D2.  Such a rightward shift in the 
demand curve would imply an increase in the benefits provided by all computers, both old and 
new.
25     
  Although the invention of the Internet is usually treated as revolutionary, a simple 
analysis of the supply and demand for computer hardware may suggest a more limited role. We 
                                                           
23.  Three examples of this graph applied to computers exhibiting no shift in the demand curve are 
Brynjolfsson (1996, p 290), Gordon (1990, p 46) , and Sichel (1997, p 17).  The supply curves in this graph have 
been drawn as horizontal lines, both to simplify the subsequent discussion and because there is no evidence of a 
rising marginal cost of producing additional computer speed, memory, and other characteristics at a given level of 
technology. 
24.  Here to simplify the presentation we will take the Internet as being synonomous with the World Wide 
Web and the invention of web browsers, although the use of the Internet for e-mail, at least in the academic and 
scientific community, dates back at least to the early 1980s.   
 
25.  In terms of elementary economics, there is an increase in the consumer surplus associated with the 
lower supply curve S2 from the triangle JP2B to the larger triangle KP2E.   Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 36 
 
 
have already seen that the rate of decline of prices for computer hardware, including peripherals, 
accelerated sharply after 1995.  This fact is shown in the bottom from of Figure 8, which plots 
the price and quantity of computer characteristics since 1960.  The implicit price deflator for 
computer hardware, including peripherals, declined from 70,969 in 1961 to 20 in 2002 (with a 
base 1996 = 100), for an annual rate of decline of 20.0 percent per annum.  There has been a 
corresponding increase in the quantity of computer attributes, and both the rate of price decline 
and quantity increase accelerated after 1995.   
  Although the rate of price change has varied over time, a rapid price decline in 1995-
2000 does not distinguish the New Economy from the 1960–1980 interval dominated by the 
mainframe computer or the 1980–1985 interval dominated by the transition from mainframe to 
PC applications prior to the invention of the Internet.
26  If there had been a discontinuous 
rightward shift in the demand curve for computer hardware due to the spread of the Internet, we 
should have observed a noticeable flattening of the slope of the price-quantity relationship in the 
bottom frame of Figure 8a, as the rate of increase of quantity accelerated relative to the rate of 
decline in price, but we do not.  The rate of change of price and quantity both accelerate after 
1995 (as indicated by the greater spacing between annual observations) but the slope does not 
change appreciably, suggesting that the spread of the Internet is a byproduct of rapid 
technological change that is faster than in previous decades but not qualitatively different in the 
relationship between supply and demand than earlier advances in the computer industry.   
  The data on the price and quantity of computer characteristics have previously been used 
                                                           
26.  Existing computer price deflators fail to take account of the radical decline in the price per calculation 
that occurred in the transition from mainframes to PCs (which have been studied only separately, not together).  
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to “map out” the demand curve (Brynjolfsson 1996, p 290).  In fact, the slope of the price-
quantity relationship was appreciably flatter during 1972–1987 than during 1987–1995 or 1995–
2000.  If the demand curve has not shifted, the inverse of these slopes is the price elasticity of 
demand, namely –2.03, –1.33, and –1.19 in these three intervals, which can be compared with 
Brynjolfsson’s (1996, p 292) estimated price elasticity of –1.33 over the period 1970–1989 (the 
implied elasticity in the slump period 2000–2002 was only –0.28).  The apparent decline in the 
price elasticity is consistent with the view that the most important uses of computers were 
developed prior to 1987, not in the late 1990s. 
 
VII.  Unsustainable Sources of Demand for ICT Investment in the Late 1990s 
Our discussion of unsustainable demand for ICT investment begins with the least 
controversial component of the argument that supply does not create its own demand.  It is 
uncontroversial because it—the bubble and subsequent meltdown in telecom equipment 
investment, especially in fiber-optic cable and in the communication infrastructure of the 
Internet—has already happened.   We then turn to computer equipment, peripherals, and 
software, where optimists like Jorgenson point to the inexorable future explosion of computer 
power made possible by Moore’s Law, and we assemble a growing body of evidence showing 
that much of the extra computer power is not needed and will not be purchased. 
 
The Telecom Equipment Bubble and Meltdown  
Of all the different components of ICT investment, the most staggering mismatch 
between supply and demand occurred in fiber-optic telephone lines.   During the 1990s, new 
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technology made possible an explosion in the carrying capacity of a given fiber-optic line at a 
pace that made progress in computer microprocessors look anemic by comparison.  Until 1995 it 
was possible to transmit only one color of data-carrying light through fiber-optic lines, but the 
development of “dense-wave division multiplexing” split the single beam into a spectrum of 
colors and multiplied capacity by as much as a factor of 300.  Over a seven-year period, the 
capacity of telephone lines increased by more than in the previous 100 years; the number of one-
page e-mails that could be sent over one fiber-optic strand increased from 25,000 in 1995 to 25 
million in 2002.  Yet the cost of providing 1,000 times more capacity increased minimally and in 
some cases declined. 
  Oversupply was so great that the cost of renting an intercity data line dropped at a rate of 
67 percent per year between 2000 and 2002, but despite the stimulus to demand from these lower 
prices, the growth of demand fell so far behind the growth in supply that, in 2002, fully 97 
percent of fiber-optic capacity remained unutilized.  The implied 3 percent utilization rate was 
without precedent in industrial history and led to an unparalleled series of corporate bankruptcies 
and the evaporation of $2 trillion in shareholder wealth and 500,000 industry jobs.
27 
  Given the advance in technology, another outcome was possible.  If each fiber-optic line 
had such an increase in its capacity, then supply could have remained matched to demand if 
fewer lines were built.  The underlying assumption that led to overinvestment was heady 
optimism, the same factor that propelled the NASDAQ stock market bubble.  One frequently 
quoted number, which has been traced to a corporate memo written in 1997, was that Internet 
traffic was doubling every 100 days, implying an annual growth rate of around 1,100 percent 
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(Dreazen 2002).  It never occurred to telecom executives, or the Wall Street analysts promoting 
their stocks, that such growth rates would imply that within a few years every member of the US 
population would be spending 24 hours per day connected to the Internet, and that Internet 
revenues would exceed 100 percent of GDP.  In actual fact, the annual growth rate of Internet 
traffic for 2003 has been estimated to be closer to 50 percent per year than 1,000 percent.
28 
  Telecom equipment, even more than the stock market, appears to have been history’s 
classic example of “irrational exuberance” in several meanings of that term, including irrational 
demand forecasts, stock price increases, and debt incurred, resulting in an unprecedented value 
of equity wiped out in one after another debt-heavy bankruptcy.   
 
Differences between Computer and Telecom Investment 
At first glance, the telecom equipment investment bubble may seem quite irrelevant for 
computers, peripherals, and software, the heart of the New Economy that made possible the 
WWW and the dotcom e-commerce revolution.  Nothing like the overbuilding of telecom 
equipment capacity occurred with computer hardware, and the utilization of the equipment 
devoted to making computer chips, personal computers, laptops, and peripherals such as  
monitors and printers was closer to 100 percent than the 3 percent recorded for fiber-optic cable. 
  Yet a central topic of this paper is not utilization rates, but the extent to which the growth 
rate of ICT investment in the late 1990s was sustainable.  For computers, the annual rate of 
decline of prices provided an ever-growing supply of computer characteristics—that is, speed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from Berman (2002).   
28.  If supply quadruples every year while demand grows by 50 percent per year, and if demand and supply 
are equal in year 1, then by year 5 the ratio of demand to supply is only 2 percent. 
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and memory—and the demand for these characteristics was sufficient to boost temporarily the 
share of nominal computer investment in nominal GDP, as was displayed in Figure 3.  However, 
the core factors that created the demand for computers in the late 1990s were in part 
unsustainable, and this implies that similar increases in the supply of computer power over the 
next decade (2002–2012) may be accompanied by a less than proportionate increase in the 
quantity of computer power demanded by the marketplace. 
 
The Web could be Invented Only Once  
The period between 1995 and 1999 witnessed the instant deployment and diffusion of the 
World Wide Web (WWW).  Whereas few business firms knew anything about web sites in 1995, 
by 1998–1999 every business, government agency, university, and other nonprofit organization 
was compelled to develop its own web site.  Constructing a web site required buying one or more 
servers and hiring numerous software engineers to design the pages, their interaction within the 
site, and the hyperlinks to external sites.  The period 1998–2000 represented the peak of this 
investment activity, with its required purchases of hardware and software, but this level of 
frenetic activity could not be sustained forever.
 29  Once each component of the web site “went 
live,” subsequently it would need only to be maintained and incrementally improved.  The 
hardware requirements of such incremental improvements may have been minor, even 
negligible, while the software investment was far less than had been needed to create the initial 
site. 
  The wave of investment in Internet infrastructure went beyond web sites available to 
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external customers.  During the same period in the late 1990s, many business firms reorganized 
their internal communications systems as “intranets,” web-based internal communication 
systems.  Once the bugs were sorted out and these systems became operational, the investments 
had been made.  Although computer manufacturers had become accustomed to a three-year 
replacement cycle in which old computers were routinely replaced by new computers, many 
firms currently view their late 1990s intranet investments as long-lasting and do not need to 
repeat the hardware or software purchases of the boom years.  In the words of the Chief 
Information Officer of Mohawk Carpets, “We’re not spending as much because we already spent 
it” (Thurm 2001). 
 
Legacy of the Failed Dotcoms  
Another pillar of the ICT investment boom of the late 1990s was the demand for 
computer hardware and software by the thousands of newly established e-commerce business 
firms collectively known as the dotcoms.  Spurred by easily available finance from venture 
capitalists and IPOs, a booming economy, and overblown expectations, the “dotcoms” were 
touted as a new industrial revolution: 
 “The Internet has become a powerful symbol of society’s expectations about the future—a 
future of fast-moving, disruptive technology that is shifting the 
terrain not only in business, but also in politics and culture. . . . 
Because it is such a low-cost communications technology, the 
Internet holds the promise of drastically reducing transactions 
costs. . . . Organizational bureaucracies of every kind—corporate, 
government, and union—suddenly look vulnerable to the Internet’s 
decentralizing powers” (Lohr 1999). 
 
 
  But the heralded dotcoms soon came crashing to the ground, leaving a legacy of failed 
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business models, not to mention a surfeit of unneeded computer hardware that soon flooded the 
market for used equipment, in turn bringing to a halt the previously rapid growth in the demand 
for new equipment.  Some of the used equipment eventually found new users, but much of the 
software dedicated to the specific requirements of individual e-commerce web sites became 
instantly worthless. 
  An early virtue of e-commerce was the intense competition fostered by low costs of 
entry, pushing the economy toward the classroom model of perfect competition.  But e-
commerce firms soon learned that competition brings benefits to the consumer but leaves little if 
any residual in the form of operating profits.  Thus much of the investment in computer hardware 
and software infrastructure for the dotcom boom ultimately had a zero or negative rate of return 
(as we suggested earlier in discussing the Oliner-Sichel productivity decomposition in Table 4).  
Further, the extent of reduction in transactions costs was exaggerated.  For many products, e-
commerce was just a new type of mail-order catalogue, providing an electronic interface for 
placing orders that eliminated the need for telephone operators, but no change in the technology 
of warehouses or delivery.  As failed companies such as the e-grocer Webvan were soon to 
discover, the costs of the warehouses and delivery swamped the savings provided by the 
electronic order interface.
30    
  If consumer e-commerce provided benefits to consumers without profits for dotcoms, 
then surely business e-commerce (“B2B”) delivered benefits to businesses that flowed directly to 
                                                           
30.  On the demise of Webvan see Spurgeon (2001).  Among the problems cited, besides the costs of huge 
warehouses and truck fleets, were the reluctance of “busy people who have little time to sit home waiting for a 
delivery. . . the challenge remains being able to develop a large enough customer base to offset the costs of picking 
and delivering those groceries on a profitable basis.”  Further, time-pressed consumers chose not to turn to web 
delivery services but to buying prepared food in traditional supermarkets:  “It turns out, however, that shopping isn’t 
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the bottom line.  Unfortunately B2B did not live up to its original promise; “many exchanges 
have shut down, and virtually all the rest are badly behind schedule in implementing their 
business plans” (Gomes 2001).  What business firms need from their suppliers are “relationships, 
consistency, quality, and reliability” (Tedeschi 2001).  For instance, a produce wholesaler had no 
use for produce Internet sites, because they lacked the element of trust that reassured customers 
that produce was fresh and top quality rather than rotting on the vine.  Firms found that public e-
commerce sites for buying supplies offered the same price to everyone, whereas firms had 
become used to developing individual relationships with suppliers and having price 
arrangements that were confidential.  The produce wholesaler was quoted as rejecting the 
Internet for making public information that was previously confidential:  “The Internet is very 
good at taking one message and sending it out to the whole world. . . . That’s not the way our 
world works” (Gomes 2001).  Firms also were concerned about reliability and the chance that 
some B2B web sites would not remain in business, a fear that soon came to be realized.
31 
 
Software Innovation is Falling behind Hardware Innovation  
Throughout the history of the computer industry, purchase and replacement decisions 
have been driven by the need to purchase new hardware in order to be able to operate 
increasingly complex software.  Computer chip makers continually increased the speed and 
memory capability of computers, and hard drive manufacturers more than kept pace.
32  But the 
                                                           
31.  Ironically, the much heralded e-business technological revolution that was supposed to increase 
dramatically the efficiency of inventory management did not prevent one of the largest pile-ups of excess inventory 
in economic history, not only in ICT equipment but also in the economy as a whole, where inventory accumulation 
was negative for five straight quarters, 2001:Q1 to 2002:Q1. 
 
32.  My first PC in 1983 had a hard drive capacity of a mere 10MB.  Today’s standard 40GB hard drives 
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minimum performance required to run the latest software also continued to increase, and users 
were continually under pressure to replace obsolescent machines with new ones capable of 
keeping up with software improvements.  As the saying went, “What Intel giveth, Microsoft 
taketh away.”   
  Perhaps the most controversial assertion of this paper is that this race is over, Intel has 
won, and Microsoft is lagging badly behind.  Evidence keeps accumulating that computer users 
do not feel the same impetus to buy replacement computers as before, because improvements in 
software have ground nearly to a halt.  Consider this comment by the dean of computer 
columnists, Walter Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal, in reflecting on the tenth anniversary of 
his column: 
“The upgrade cycle in PC’s has all but petered out.  Back in 1991, 
we still lived in an era when people needed to buy the latest and 
greatest processors and other hardware, just to run all the new 
software.  But it has been at least four years since software 
challenged hardware in that way.  Today, the killer app is the 
Internet, and it doesn’t require the fastest, biggest PCs.  It only 
thirsts for faster connection speeds, greater bandwidth” (Mossberg 
2001). 
 
  Mossberg is not alone in his assessment.  Everyday, forecasts of slumping computer sales 
now routinely refer to the absence of compelling software:  “Though PCs have grown more 
powerful, a lack of new software has dulled their shine for holiday sales. . . . Consumers no 
longer are excited by faster processors running the same old programs” (McWilliams and Tam 
2002).  “Consumers and businesses have shown little inclination to shell out for new computers 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
somewhat less, by a factor of about 1,000.  This represents an annual rate of performance change of about 36 percent 
for speed and memory, and about 44 percent for hard drive capacity. 
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that do not offer significant improvements. . . . After Windows 95 was released PCs have not 
changed so much.” (Reuters 2002, p C3). 
33  Other computer columnists concur:  “There are 
many reasons for the current slump in personal computer sales, but one of the most important is 
the lack of software that gives us a compelling reason to replace our machines” (Wildstrom 
2001).   
Simple increases in computer speed and memory are not enough:  “Even personal 
computer industry veterans acknowledge the paucity of new ideas that currently troubles the 
computer industry. . . . computers have reached a point where for the most common home 
purposes—Web surfing, e-mail, and word processing—they are already more than fast enough to 
suit a typical home user’s needs.  As long as new PC’s are just faster, cheaper, better than old 
PC’s, you’re going to get slow growth” (Markoff 2002).     
The lack of compelling new types of software has translated into a stalling out of the 
advance of computer penetration in the American home.  After growing from 30 to 60 percent 
between 1995 and 2001, the share of households with PCs remained unchanged at 60 percent in 
2002.  Worse yet, the reason most holdouts gave for not owning a computer at home was not 
price or technological ignorance, but that they “just had no compelling reasons to own PCs” 
(Gaither 2002).  Part of the problem may be that the initial novelty of the web has worn off for 
early users, while current non-users are not persuaded to access the web.  Another issue is the 
very source of the demise of many early dotcom firms: they could not figure out how to make a 
profit.  The web now teems with advertising and user fees, repelling some early users:  
                                                           
33.  Article from Reuters with no author listed, “PC sales fail to rev up as school starts,” Chicago Tribune, 
September 9, 2002, p. C3. 
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“Everywhere you go someone is jumping on you to buy something. . . . It’s like walking down 
the streets of Tijuana.”  For some users the novelty value of the web has started to wear off: “I’m 
a frontiersperson, and the Web is not a frontier anymore. . . . It is simply a place” (both quotes 
from Guernsey 2002). 
  To be sure, some computer users always value more speed and memory, especially those 
whose main uses are games and the downloading of photos, video, and audio.  But we are 
primarily interested in business rather than consumer uses of computers, since business uses are 
presumably those that contribute to productivity growth in the private business economy.  
Consumer use of computers for games, video, and audio may raise consumer welfare, but not in 
a way that increases measured output per hour.    And it is in the business world where the shift 
in attitudes about computer enhancement and replacement is most profound.  As one corporate 
Chief Information Officer stated, “There is no commercial incentive to upgrade computers 
anymore.  The hardware and software guys know it, and they are desperate about it.”  The CIO 
previously upgraded his 15,000 PCs every two or three years, but now says that he will do the 
next big overhall “in a few years, maybe” (both quotes from Hardy, 2002). 
 
Y2K Compressed the Replacement Cycle  
The final, and probably least important, of the factors that temporarily boosted the 
demand for computers in the late 1990s was the much-publicized potential crisis regarding the 
inability of existing software, primarily older versions of programs written before the mid-1990s, 
to handle the transition from years beginning in “19XX” to “20XX.”  An enormous investment 
in software reprogramming occurred throughout 1998 and 1999 at almost every corporation, 
large and small.  Some unknown part of the rapid growth of real computer investment displayed Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 47 
 
 
above in Figure 2 above was related to the Y2K phenomenon, and particularly the compression 
of the normal replacement cycle as computers scheduled for normal replacement in 2000 and 
2001 were instead replaced in 1998 and 1999. 
 
Is Broadband the Answer? 
If anything can stimulate purchases of ICT equipment in the next few years, it is the 
adoption of broadband in every American household that currently accesses the internet via slow 
dial-up connections.  An immediate qualification is that American corporate business already has 
fast connections, and even college freshmen have lightning-fast access to the internet from their 
dorm rooms.  Whatever impact on business productivity made possible by universal adoption of 
broadband in the American corporate and institutional world has already occurred.  A rush to 
install broadband connections in the American household would not have a direct impact on 
business productivity, since its major effect would be to allow faster downloading of video, 
music, and games.   
  But American households are not rushing to convert to broadband.  In early 2002 
adoption rates for all types of broadband was below 10 percent and was not rising at the rate that 
had been expected.  Noam (2002) provides three reasons.  First, broadband is not free, and it 
costs substantially more to provide than ordinary dial-up on an existing residential telephone 
line.  Second, the network effects that multiply the benefits of an invention like e-mail when it is 
universally adopted do not apply to broadband, since if Uncle Harry switches from dial-up to 
broadband, it has no effect on the benefits to Cousin Sarah of dialing up to send an e-mail to 
Uncle Harry.  Third is “the absence of a strong reason to have it. . . . There is only so much free 
time and attention to go around in a day, and there is no indication that broadband users use the Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 48 
 
 
Internet much differently than narrowband users. . . . we must push the demand side of 
broadband to catch up with the supply” (Noam, 2002, p. 4, p. 9). 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
Many studies have linked the post-1995 productivity growth revival in the United States 
to the acceleration in the growth of ICT investment that occurred at the same time.  At first 
glance, their link between productivity and ICT would seem to imply that the revival had a single 
source—ICT investment—achieved both through its production and use.  An acceleration in the 
growth of real investment in computers made possible more rapid MFP growth in the production 
of computers, as well as a greater contribution to productivity growth through capital deepening 
as the rest of the economy purchased and used the new, more powerful computers. 
  This paper brings both bad news and good news to the debate over the role of ICT capital 
and the future outlook for productivity growth.  The bad news, and the main contribution of the 
paper, is that the ICT investment boom of the late 1990s was inherently transitory and 
unsustainable for both macroeconomic and microeconomic reasons.  The growth rate of ICT 
investment did not occur in isolation but was supported by a positive feedback loop among an 
unusual confluence of positive macroeconomic shocks, including the stock market boom, a set of 
beneficial supply shocks that reduced inflation, and the role of low inflation in creating the 
benign tolerance by the Federal Reserve of unusually rapid output growth and a decline in the 
unemployment rate without precedent in the preceding three decades.  At the same time, the 
growth rate of ICT investment was supported by a set of transitory microeconomic sources of 
demand for ICT equipment, including the telecom investment bubble, the fact that the World Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 49 
 
 
Wide Web could be invented only once, the equipment and software purchases by the dotcoms 
that promptly failed, and the last gasp of Microsoft and other software makers as they struggled 
to find ways for firms and consumers to use the explosion in the growth of computer power 
made possible by the inexorable advance of Moore’s Law.  
  The good news is that a failure of ICT investment growth to return to the heady days of 
the late 1990s does not doom productivity growth to return to the dismal decades prior to 1995.  
The best recent work on the sources of the productivity revival between 1995 and 2001 attributes 
all of this revival to the growth acceleration in ICT investment.  Taken literally, this work 
implies that if the growth rate of ICT investment falls back to its pre-1995 pace, productivity 
growth will likewise return to its pre-1995 rate.  But it is possible that this recent research 
overstates, perhaps substantially, the contribution of ICT investment to the productivity revival.  
Recent writing on productivity growth points to retail trade as a key locus of the role of 
computers in creating productivity growth, reasoning that retailing is an industry that both uses 
ICT equipment heavily and displays a robust productivity growth revival at the level of industry 
data. 
  But much more has been going on in the retail sector, and presumably in other industrial 
sectors that are heavy users of ICT equipment, than just buying lots of computers and software.  
Micro evidence at the level of individual establishments shows that all of the productivity growth 
in the retail sector in the 1990s was achieved by new establishments, and that none of it was 
achieved by establishments already existing in 1990, no matter how many computers they 
bought.  This suggests that a central role in the productivity growth revival of the 1990s was a set 
of non-ICT investments and organizational innovations that we associate with “big box” retailers Innovation, Demand, and Supply, Page 50 
 
 
like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Best Buy, and others.  Old establishments checked out their 
customers with bar coder scanners, just as did new establishments, but ICT investments were 
apparently “necessary but not sufficient” for retail productivity to increase.  A complementary 
finding is that much of the failure of Europe to achieve its own productivity growth revival in the 
late 1990s can be traced to the same industries that performed so well in the United States, 
particularly retail and wholesale trade and the securities industry.  
The confluence of the bad news and good news leaves the future of productivity growth 
highly uncertain.  The macro and micro foundations of the late 1990s ICT investment boom may 
not reappear in our lifetimes, and it may be decades before we see five straight years of annual 
growth rates of ICT investment of greater than 30 percent per year.  But the role of ICT 
investment as a foundation of the productivity growth revival has been exaggerated, leaving 
other kinds of investment and organizational improvements playing a role that has not been 
sufficiently appreciated.  This conclusion, albeit not susceptible to quantification, has one 
fortunate byproduct -- it helps us understand why Europe failed to duplicate the U. S. 
productivity revival despite using the same computer hardware and software as Americans did.  
Europe’s troubles lie elsewhere and cannot be solved by purchasing more computers.  The 
environment of product and labor market regulation in Europe still, despite recent improvements, 
inhibits the bold new types of retailing formats that formed the vanguard of the U. S. 
productivity revival.  Whether Europe can loosen its straightjacket of regulations, and whether 
the U. S. can sustain these organizational improvements in the absence of a new ICT investment 
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Output per Hour in the Nonfarm Private Business Sector,
Actual Change from Four Quarters Prior and Hodrick-Prescott Trend,





























Real Investment in Computers and Peripherals and its Deflator,
Change from Four Quarters Prior, 1987-2002,




























































Household Saving Rate and Ratio of S&P500 Stock Market Index to Nominal GDP,
















































































S&P 500 to Nominal GDP Ratio (left scale)
Household Savings Rate (right scale)Figure 6
The Unemployment Rate and the Change from Four Quarters Prior
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Annual Growth Rates of Output per Hour, 1950-2002,
Selected Sectors and Intervals, in Percent
1950:Q2- 1972:Q2- 1995:Q4-  1995Q4- 2000Q2- 2001Q3-
Sector 1972:Q2 1995:Q4 2002:Q2  2000Q2 2001Q3 2002Q2
Nonfarm Private Business 2.66 1.42 2.53   2.59 0.68 5.46
       
Manufacturing 2.56 2.60 3.95  4.47 1.11 5.93
  Durables 2.34 3.05 4.94   5.94 0.07 7.09
  Nondurables 2.97 1.95 2.85   2.94 2.11 4.22
Nonfarm Nonmanufacturing 2.64 1.00 2.05   2.04 0.98 5.31Table 2
Growth Rates of Output per Hour, Nonfarm Private Business Sector,
Selected Intervals, 1955-2002
      Actual    Trend   Cyclical
Interval       Growth    Growth    Effect
1955:Q4-1965:Q4 2.99 2.90 0.09
1965:Q4-1975:Q4 2.02 2.25 -0.23
1975:Q4-1985:Q4 1.44 1.33 0.11
1985:Q4-1995:Q4 1.39 1.54 -0.15
    
1995:Q4-2000:Q2 2.59 2.15 0.44
2000:Q2-2001:Q3 0.68 2.25 -1.57
2001:Q3-2002:Q2 5.46 2.22 3.24
Sources:  Actual growth from Bureau of Labor Statistics, trend growth estimed as a
     Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 6400.  The same series is
     plotted in Figure 1.
    Table 3
Growth Rates of Output per Hour, Nonfarm Private Business Sector,
Four Quarters at Start of Recovery and Next Eight Quarters
Initial Four Next Eight
Interval   Quarters Quarters
1975:Q1-1976:Q1 4.63 0.99
1982:Q3-1983:Q3 5.19 1.58  
1991:Q1-1992:Q1 4.01 1.15
2001:Q3-2002:Q2 5.46               ???
  
Source:  Bureau of Labor StatisticsTable 4
Contributions to Growth in Labor Productivity by Source
1973-95 vs. 1995-2001 and post-1995 Growth Acceleration
1973- 1995- Post-1995
1995 2001 Change
Labor Productivity 1.40 2.25 0.85
 
Contributions from:
Capital Deepening 0.71 1.17 0.46
   Information Technology Capital 0.42 0.97 0.55
   Other Capital 0.30 0.20 -0.10
 
Labor Quality 0.27 0.25 -0.02
 
Multifactor Productivity 0.42 0.83 0.41
   Information Technology Capital 0.30 0.73 0.43
   Other Sectors 0.12 0.10 -0.02
 
Memo:  Total IT Contribution 0.72 1.70 0.98
Source:  Unpublished update to Oliner and Sichel (2002), provided by the authors.Table 5
            Labor Productivity by Industry Group, U. S. vs. Europe,
            1990-95 vs. 1995-2000, Annual Growth Rates in Percent
1990- 1995- 1990- 1995-
1995 2000 1995 2000
Total Economy 1.1 2.2 2.4 1.5
 
ICT Producing Industries 6.1 6.5 6.0 8.5
ICT Using Industries  1.4 4.2 1.9 1.3
  
Non-ICT Industries 0.4 0.4 2.4 1.0
 
  
Source:  van Ark et. Al. (2002, Table 5).
United States European Union